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ABSTRACT
Perceived shortcomings in the quality of American education at the
elementary and secondary school levels have drawn much public attention
recently. In particular, concern with the composition of' the teacher force
has been prominent. Informed assessment of the various proposals for
increasing the quality of the teaching force is possible only if we can
forecast the extent to which these proposals, if enacted, would influence
the occupational choice decisions of high ability young adults. Until now,
there has been no basis for making such forecasts.
The research reported here examines the relationships between
academic ability, earnings, and the decision to become a teacher through
analysis of data from a national sample of college graduates. Inspection of
the data reveals that the frequency of choice of teaching as an occupation
is inversely- related to academic ability. Conditioning on sex and academic
ability, the earnings of teachers are much lower, on average, than those of
other working college graduates. Conditioning on sex, the earnings of
teachers tend to rise only slightly, if at all, with academic ability.
An econometric analysis suggests that in the absence of a minimum
ability standard, increases in teacher earnings would yield substantial
growth in the size of the teaching force but minimal improvement in the
average academic ability of teachers. If teacher salaries are not
increased, institution of a minimum ability standard would improve the
average ability of the teaching force but reduce its size. The average
ability of the teaching force can be improved and the size of the teaching
force maintained if minimum ability standards are combined with sufficient
salary increases. It appears that the average academic ability of teachers
can be raised to the average of all college graduates if a minimum SAT score
(verbal +math)of 800 is required for teacher certification and teacher
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1. INTRODUCTION
Perceived shortcomings in the quality of American education at the
elementary and secondary school levels have drawn much public attention
recently. In particular, concern with the composition of the teacher
force has been prominent. This focus presumably arises out of the
juxtaposition of three factors.
First, there is general acceptance of the proposition that
educational achievement is influenced by the ability of the teachers who
guide the learning process. (There is, of course, much less agreement
about how educational achievement and teacher ability should be
measured.) Second1 there is an often expressed dissatisfaction with the
distribution of ability within the present teaching force. Third, there
is a common perception that feasible changes in public policy can
generate a shift in the ability distribution of the supply of teachers.
In particular1 it is asserted that merit pa', general increases in
teacher salaries, and/or subsidization of the college education of
prospective teachers would induce more college students of high ability
to select teaching as a career.
Informed assessment o-f the various proposals for increasing the
attractiveness of teaching is possible only if we can forecast the
extent to which these proposals, if enacted, would influenc& the
occupational choice decisions of high ability ycuna adults. Until now,
there has been no basis for making such forecasts. In the absence of
empirical analysis, we can only guess at the impact of changes in
teacher salaries on the quality composition of the teaching force.2
The research reported here examines the relationship betweenacademic
ability, earnings, and the decision to become a teacher throughanalysis
of data from a national sample of college graduates. TheNational
Longitudinal Study of the High School Class of 1972(NLS72) surveyed
22,652 high school seniors in the spring of 1972 and has subsequently
followed this panel as its members have progressed through post—
secondary education and into the labor force. The most recent survey
took place in October, 1979. At that time, contact was successfully
made with 18,630 members of the panel. Of these, 3502 reported
themselves as having completed a Bachelor's degree in 1976 or 1977. 0-f
this group, 2952 reported that they were working in October, 1979. Of
these, 510 reported that they were employed as teachers.
The NLS72 data offer a valuable resource for description of the
empirical pattern of ability, earnings, and occupations found in a
recent cohort of American college graduates. Inspection of these data
reveals the following:
*Amongthe working NL572 respondents who have received a bachelor '
degree,the frequency of choice of teaching as an occupation is
inversely related to academic ability. This holds whether academic
ability is measured by SAT score or by high school class rank.
Conditioningon SAT score, however, the frequency of choice o+
teaching does not vary with class rank.
*Conditioningon sex and academic ability, the earnings of teachers
are much lower, on average, than those of other working college
graduates.
*Conditioningon sex, the earnings of teachers tend to rise only -
slightly,if at all, with academic ability. A relationship between)
earningsand ability is more noticeable in other occupations but
remains weak. Academic ability explains only a small part of the
observed variation in earnings within the cohort of NLS72 college
graduates.
* Conditioning on academic ability and occupation, males consistently
have higher earnings than do females.. The sex differential in
earnings is relatively small in teaching but quite pronounced in other
occupations. Interestingly, the rate at which earnings rise with
ability is very similar for males and females.
To evaluate policy proposals intended to influence the composition of
the teaching -force, it is necessary to go beyond descriptive analysis.
The NL572 data support estimation of an econometric model e>plaining
occupation choice as a function o-f the earnings and non—monetary
characteristics associated with alternative occupations. Given this
model, it is possible to forecast the consequences of policies that
combine increases in teacher salaries with the institution of minimum
academic ability standards for teacher certification. Forecasts
presented in this paper suggest the following:
* In the absence of a minimum ability standard, increases in teacher
earnings would yield substantial growth in the size of the teaching
force but minimal improvement in the average academic ability of
teachers. Under present conditions, the aggregate wage elasticity o-F
the supply of teachers appears to be in the range of two to three. As
wages increase, both high and low ability students are attracted into
teachinq, so the ability composition o-f the teaching force chancies
little.
* If teacher salaries are not increased, institution 0+ a rninimu4
ability standard improves the average ability of the teaching force
but reduces its size. Establishment of a standard sufficient to raise
the average academic ability of teachers to the average of all college
graduates may reduce the size of the teaching force by twenty percent.
*Theaverage ability of the teaching force can be improved and the size
of the teaching force maintained if minimum ability standards are
combined with sufficient salary increases. it appears that the
average academic ability of teachers can be raised tothe average of
all college graduates if a minimum SAT score(verbal +math)of 900 is
required for teacher certification and teacher salaries are raised by
about ten percent over their present levels. To achieve further
improvements in average teacher ability without reducing the size of
the teaching force would require a higher minimum ability standard
combined with a larger salary increase.
Eefore proceeding, it is important to stress that the indicators o-f
ability available for the NL572 panel and used in this research are
certain measures o-f academic success, namely SAT scores and high school
class rank.It seems reasonable to assume that these variables are
positively associated with performance as a teacher but -formal evidence
for this proposition is lacking. See, for example, the discu5sion in
Weaver(1983). The relevance of the analysis that follows to the debate
over the quality of the teacher force depends on the extent to which
academic ability and teaching ability coincide.
The plan of the paper is as follows. Section 2 describes the NL572
sample and the variables that measure occupation, academic ability, and
earnings. Section 3 reports our descriptive analysis of the NLS72 data.
The econometric model explaining occupation choices is developed and5
estimated in Section 4. The model is applied to forecast the effects of
policy proposals in Section 5. Section 6 contains brief concluding
comments..
2.COMPOSITION OF THE SAMPLE AND DEFINITION OF VARIABLES
A.The Sample
The work in this paper is based entirely on data for the 2952 NLS72
respondents who, when interviewed in late 1979, reported that they had
received a bachelor's degree in 1976 or 1977 and that they were working
in October, 1979. Some of the analysis is based on the subsample of
respondents for whom complete academic ability and earnings data were
available. Acomprehensivedescription of the NLS72 data including the
sample design, questionnaires, and frequency counts of responses is
given in Riccobono et al. (1981).
D.The Occupation Variable
In all that follows, a respondent's occupation is taken to be his
declared job type in October, 1979 s coded by the NLS into the threE—
digit Census classification system. In the crosstabulations of Tables
1,2,and4, these codes are aggregated into three occupation classes.
being:6
(a)teachers, exclusive of college faculty(Census codes 141—145)
(b)professional, technical, and kindred workers, exclusive of
teachers(Census codes 001—140,150—195)
(c)all other occupations(Census codes 201—992).
In the models of Tables 3,5, and 6, classes (b) and Cc) are further
aggregated into a single 'non—teaching 'occupation.
In principle, the Census coding system distinguishes various
categories of teachers. In practice, this detailed coding is ambiguous
because 275 of the 510 teachers are not classified. Of the ones who are
classified, 35 are reported to be nursery and kindergarten teachers, 104
to be elementary school teachers, 92 to be secondary school teachers,
and 4 to be adult education teachers. These are small samples,
particularly when disaggregated by sex.
Coded as unclassified teachers are such groups as fine arts teachers
and flying instructors as well as those school teachers whose response
to the occupation question was insufficiently detailed to permit a more
refined classification. Examination of the employer codes for the
classified and unclassified teachers reveals that 59 percent of the
former group and 60 percent of the latter group work for governmental
units. The ability and earnings distributions n-f the two groupsarealso
quite similar. These facts make it reasonable to assume that the
unclassified group is composed primarily of elementary and high school
teachers. Given this and given the small size of the classified group,
the statistics presented here are computed using all respondents coded
as teachers, not just those for whom a more detuiled classification is
available.
It should be noted that the NL572 survey o4ferssomealternatives to7
our identification of occupation with job type in October, 1979. First,
whenever a respondent reported that he had worked in October, 1978 or
October, 1977, job type at these dates was reported. Second, when
interviewed in 1979, each panel member was asked to anticipate his
occupation at age 30(that is about five years into the future). Third,
each respondent was asked to report the field in which he received his
bachelors degree..I have chosen to use the October, 1979 job reports
because they are the latest revealed preference data available for the
NLS72 respondents..It would be of interest to redo the analysis using
alternative definitions of occupation.
C.The Academic Ability Variables
As part of the base year survey instrument administered in 1972, the
NLS obtained from guidance personnel the percentile high school class
rank of each respondent and, where available, each respondent SAT or
ACT score. A battery of IQ and aptitude tests was administered as well.
In this paper, academic ability is measured by the class rank and
SAT/ACT data. The NLS test battery data are not used here.
Among the 2952 respondents, class rank information is available for
2287. Either an SAT or ACT score is available for 2468 respondents, with
the former predominating. While the SAT and ACT examinations are
distinct, I have, in the interest of using observations efficiently,
converted each ACT score to an SAT equivalent by matching the tonth and
ninetieth percentile scores and interpolating elsewhere. The rationale
for using both the class rank and SAT score as measures of acaiernic8
ability is that the two have previously been shown to have complementary
explanatory power in predicting both college admissions decisions and
college completion rates(Manski and Wise, 1983)..
D.The Earnings Variable
Each respondent working in October, 1979 was asked to report his
gross pay per week at his primary Job. Hours worked per week at the
primary job was also reported. In the parts of this paper concerned
with earnings, I restrict attention to the 2335 respondents whose
reported hours worked per week is between thirty and sixty and whose
reported pay per week is between one hundred and eight hundred dollars.
The restriction on hours worked is intended to limit attention to
normal full time jobs.. The restriction on pay cuts off volunteer
workers on the low end and, on the high end, a few respondents whose
reported weekly pay seemed extraordinary for a twentyfive year old in
1979
The reported pay per week is used as the measure of realized
earnings. An obvious alternative measure is the hourly wage, computed b
dividing gross pay by hours worked. The former measure seems preferable
since most college graduates are paid on a salary rather than hourly
basis.. Empirically, the same patterns emerge whichever earnings measure
is used..
Note that all monetary figures in this paper are expressed in 1979
dollars.9
3..PATTERNS OF ACADEMIC ABILITY, OCCUPATION, AND EARNINGS
A.Academic Ability and Occupation
Considering males and females separately, Table 1 partitions the
sample respondents into four- SAT score groups and, for each group,
presents the observed distribution of occupations.In Table 2,
percentile class rank in high school is used as the measure of ability.
These data clearly corroborate the conventional wisdom that choice of
teaching as an occupation is inversely related to academic ability.. It
does not matter whether we look at males or females, whether we take SAT
score or class rank as the measure of academic ability. In each case,
the frequency with which the NLS72 respondents enter teaching falls
substantially as academic ability rises. In contrast, the frequency with
which respondents work in professional or technical fields other than
teaching consistently rises with ability, in fact dramatically so.
Other crosstabulations of SAT scores and occupation basd on NL572
data have been presented in Vance and Shlachty(1982). Their criteria
for inclusion in the sample and for classification of a respondent as a
teacher were diffferent than those used here. Their findings were
si mi 1 ar.
Table 3offersfurther perspective on the relationship between
academic ability and occupation. Considering males and females
separately, this table presents estimates for a simple probit model
explaining the probability that a working college graduate i a teacher10
conditionalon his SAT score and class rank. Inspection of the results
indicates that when SAT score and class rank are conditioned on jointly,
the partial effect of SAT scare on the probability of entering teaching
is almost identically negative and statistically significant f or males
and females. On the other hand, the partial effect of class rank is
very weak and ambiguous in sign. In fact, it is reasonable to conclude
that holding SAT score fixed, the probability of entering teaching does
not vary with class rank.
B.Academic Ability, Occupation, and Earnings
Considering males and females separately1 Table 4 partitions the
sample into twelve SAT score—occupation cells. Presented in each cell
are (i) mean pay per week, (ii) the number of respondents in the cell,
and (iii) the standard deviation of pay per week.I have computed
alternative tables using hourly wage as the measure of earnings and
class rank as the measure of academic ability and have found patterns
very similar to those in Table 4. Among the many interesting features
of Table 4 are the following:
*Conditioningon sex and SAT score, mean pay per week is almost always
highest for professional and technical workers and lowest for
teachers, with workers in other occupations in between. For males, the
differentials are more substantial than for females. For example,
considering males with SAT score in the 901—1000 range, the mean pay
ofprofessional workers is1. 411 ti,'-ies that of teachers.For females,
thecomparablenumber is 1.22.11
* Conditioning on sex, mean pay per weeki the non—teaching occupations
tends to rise with SAT score but the pattern is weak. For teachers,
there is little evidence of an earnings—abi1itypattern. A relation-
ship becomes more apparent if we do not condition on occupation.
Examination of the column marginalsindicatesclearly that mean pay
does increase with SAT score.In particular, the mean pay of males
with score in the 1200—1600 range is 1.18.timesthat of those with
score in the 400—BOO range. For females, the comparable number is
1.27.
-
*Conditioning on SAT score-and occupation, males consistently have
higher mean pay per week thar female;. This pattern persists in
almost every SAT score—occupatiorb, celL-but .S.r least pronounced among
teachers. To cite somereanipIe:, -the meacipay of professional males
with SAT scor-e-in thel 1000—1200. range i 1,1 times that of females
with the same charact'eristic.s. -Consideringteachers with SAT score in
the same range, the meaninc-aipe of the males is 1.04 that of the
females. Recall that thesedata. concern a sample of respondents all
of whom graduated from high school in 1972, all of whom graduated from
college in 1976 or 1977, and all of whom are working at least thirty
hours per week and earning at least one hundred dollars per week in
1979.It is therefore difficult to attribute the observed differences
in the pay of males and females to an unobserved determinant
correlated with sex.
* Conditioning on sex and SAT score, the standard deviation of pay per
week is consistently much lower for teachers than -fortheremaining
two occupation groups. Conditioning on sex and occupation, the
standard deviation is more or less invariant across ability groups.12 
 
Conditioning on SAT score and occupation, the standard deviation is 
generally lower for females than for males.  
Table 5 gives additional insight into the behavior of earnings. 
Conditioning on sex and occupation (teacher versus nonteacher), the 
table presents ordinary least squares estimates of a model explaining 
pay per week as a linear function of SAT score and high school class 
rank. Inspection of the table indicates that academic ability explains 
only a small part of the variation in observed earnings across this 
cohort of working college graduates. This fact, which was earlier noted 
in the analysis of table 4, is expressed succinctly in the R2 
statistics, which range from .03 to .06.  
At the same time, the regressions uniformly show that conditioning 
on sex and occupation, earnings do increase with both SAT score and 
class rank. In fact, the estimated coefficients are reasonably similar 
across the four subsamples. To get a feel for magnitudes, consider a 
one hundred point increase in SAT score. The predicted effects on 
weekly earning across the four subsamples are $5.06, $7.26, $4.01, and 
$5.61 respectively. A ten percentile increase in class rank is 
associated with earnings increases of $2.85, $3.50, $4.19, and $3.69 
respectively. The marginal statistical significance of the estimated 
coefficients should make one cautious in drawing sharp implications 
from these numbers. The general pattern, however, seems firmly based.  
Comparison of the coefficients for males and females suggests that 
the earnings of males may be somewhat more sensitive to SAT score than 
are those of females but less sensitive to class rank. Again, these 
differences are relatively small. It seems more relevant to stress that 
the earnings of males and females tend to increase similarly with  13
academic ability. The differences between male and female earnings that
were seen in Table 4 show up in these regressions as differences in the
intercept coefficients. Those for males are higher than those for
females, with the discrepancy much more pronounced in occupations other
than teaching.
4.A STRUCTURAL INTERPRETATION OF THE OBSERVED PATTERNS
The patterns of academic ability, earnings, and occupation reported
in Section 2 arise out of the interaction o-f the decisions of two sets
of actors, college graduates and employers.In selecting occupations,
college graduates presumably compare the expected earnings streams and
non—monetary characteristics associated with the available alternatives.
In making job offers, employers may use measured academic ability as an
indicator of potential job performance. To the extent that academic
ability is perceived by employers to be positively associated with job
performance, college graduates with high ability will be offered more
attractive positions than are those with low ability. To the extent
that the return to ability differs across occupations, we should observe
an empirical relationship between ability and occupation choice.
In this section, we attempt to interpret the observed patterns in the
NLS data in terms of a simple econometric model with two parts. One
sub—model explains occupation choice as a function of the earnings and
non—monetary characteristics associated with alternative occupations.
Theotherexplains occupation—specific earnings as a function of
academic ability and other factors. With this done, it is possible in14
principle to predict the effect of changes in teacher salaries on the
probability that a college graduate of given academic ability selects
teaching as his occupation.
A.A Model of Occupation Choice and Earnings
Let i=1 designate the occupation of teacher and let i=O represent all
other occupations.. Let I be the population of working college graduates
and assume that each person t in I must select between the two classes
of occupations. Assume that person t associates with teaching an
expected present discounted earnings per week y(tl) and an index of non—
monetary job characteristics g+(t) .Hereg is a constant and V varies
with t. He aggregates the monetary and non—monetary characteristics
into a utility value
(la) uCti) =y(tl)+g÷ Y(t).
Non—monetary job characteristics are unobservable to us so we treat Y(t)
as a random variable distributed over 1. Given the presence of the
intercept g, we set E[(t)]=O without loss of generality.
The utility of the non—teaching occupation is
(ib) u(tO) =y(tO).
Here, we have set the index of non—monetary characteristics equal to.
zero in order to fix the origin of the utility function. Thus, the term15
g+Y(t) appearing in (la) should be interpreted as indexing the non-
monetary characteristics of teaching relative to other occupations.
Note that in (la)—(lb), u is measured in the same units as y. This
fixes the scale of the utility function as dollars.
We assume that person t selects teaching as his occupation if
(2) u(tl) —u(tO)=(y(tl)—y(tO)]+g+Y(t) > 0.
Some obvious objections may be raised against (2). This specification
of decision making ignores a host of dynamic considerations in the
determination of career paths. Moreover, it aggregates broad arrays of
heterogenous occupations into two fictitious, composite alternatives.
Nevertheless, in the interest of enabling empirical analysis, we shall
maintain (2) as a working hypothesis.
Empirically, we take the chosen occupation of an NLS respondent to be
his reported occupation in October, 1979. We do not directly observe
expected earnings but an indicator is sometimes available. That is, we
observe reported weekly pay in October, 1979 -for the chosen occupation.
Assume that the relationship between expected earnings y and reported
pay, designated Vy is
(3a) Y(tl) =d1+y(tl)+S(tl)
(3b) Y(tO) =d0+y(tO)+8(tO)
where d1 and cia are constants and &(tl) and &(tO) are random variables
over 1. Given the presence of the intercepts d1 and da, we et EES(tl)]16
=E[&(tO))=0.
Observe that d1 and d0 allow for the possibility that earnings vary
systematically over the life—cycle.. In particular, if salaries tend to
rise with seniority, then we should expect d1 and d0 to be negative
since the NLS respondents are at the beginnings of their careers. The
constants also allow for a population—wide difference between current
and permanent income. In particular, we should expect d0 and possibly d1
to be lower in a recession year than in a boom year. With d1 and d0
picking up cohort—wide differences between reported and expected
earnings, the random variables S(tl) and S(tO) represent person—specific
deviations..
Let 5(t) and R(t) be person ts observed SAT score and high school
class rank. Assume that expected earnings in teaching is a linear
function of these measures ofacademicability and of other variables
E(tl), that is
(4a) y(tl) =a1+b1*S(t)+c1*R(t)+E(tl)
where (a15b1,c1) are constants. Similarly, assume that expected earning
in the non—teaching occupation is given by
(4b) y(tO) =a+b0*S(t)+co*R(t)+€(tO)..
The coefficients (b1,c1) and (b,c0) quantify the monetary returns to
academic ability in the teaching and non—teaching occupations. The
variables E(t.1) and E(tO) represent worker—specific characteristics
other than SAT score and class rank that are known to both employers and17
workers and are perceived as related to job performance. We do not
observe these characteristics and so treat E(tl) and E(tO) as random
variables over T. Given the presence of the intercepts a1 and a0, we
set EEE(tl)] =E[E(tO)3=0.
It follows from (3) and (4) that the reported pay of NLS respondent t
is related to his SAT score and high school class rank by
(5a) YCti) =(d1+a1)+b1*S(t)+c1*R(t)+EE(tl)+E(tl)]
if the respondent is a teacher and
(5b) Y(tO) =(d0+a0)÷ b0*S(t) +c0*RCt)+E&(tO)+E(tO)]
otherwise. It follows from (2) and (4) that an NLS respondent chooses
to be a teacher if and only if
(6)(g+a3—a0) +(b1—b0)*S(t) +(cj—c0)*R(t)+[Y(t)-'-E(tl)--E(tO)]>0.
Conditionalon S and R, the probability that a person is observed to
choose teaching is
(7) Pr(i1(S,R) =Pr(i) < A + B*S+C*RIS,R)
where A E(g+a1—a0),B (b1—b0), C (c1—c0), and 11(t)—LY(t)+E(tl)—
E(tO) ]..
Considernow a policy proposal whose sole effect is to chanpe a
persons expected earnings in teaching from y(l) to yCi) +X, 'forsome18
X..Under this proposal, the probability that the person will choose
teaching as his occupation is
(8) Pr(i119,R,X) =Pr(1< A +DI'S+C*R+XIS,R,X).
If the parameters A,B,C and the distribution of tareknown, equation
(8) provides an operational means of forecasting the impact of a
proposed change in teacher salary on the occupation choice decision of a
college graduate of given academic ability.
We shall estimate the probabilistic choice model (8) under the
maintained hypothesis that conditional on (S,R),
(9) EY,S(1) ,8(O) ,E(1) ,E(O)] N(O,V)
where V is a fixed but unrestricted variance—covariance matrix. The
normality assumption aside, perhaps the most restrictive aspect of (9)
is the condition E(YIS,R) =0.That is, on average, the non—monetary
returns to ability are the same in teaching and non—teaching.
Leaving V unrestricted provides important flexibility. For one
thing, it allows for the possibility of compensating variations between
the earnings and non—monetary characteristics of a job. For example i-f,
conditional on (S,R), teaching jobs that pay well tend to have poor
working conditions and vice versa, then Y and E(1) should be negatively
correlated, all else equal.
The absence of restrictions on V also allows for any pattern of
correlation between E(1) and E(0). Consider the possibility that
employers in the teaching and non—teaching occupations value the same19
worker attributes. Then among workers with given values of S and R, a
worker who expects relatively high earnings in teaching also should
expect relatively high earnings in non—teaching. So E(1) and ECO) will
be positively correlated, all else equal. On the other hand, it may be
that the qualities valued in teaching are not valued in non—teaching.
Then, ECi) and E(O) will be uncorrelated. Leaving V unrestricted allows
for both possibilities.
Under (9), the random variable %)isnormally distributed with mean
zero and unrestricted standard deviation 0,conditionalon (S,R). Thus,
the problem of estimating the probabilistic choice model (8) reduces to
that of estimating the parameters A,B,C and 0.Forthis to be possible,
we must first establish that these parameters are identified.
To see that this is so, inspect the reduced form equations (ia)—5(b)
and (6). The identifiable parameters in C5a)—(5b) include
[(d1+a1),b1,c3], ((da+aa),ba,ca], and certain functions of the matrix V.
The identifiable parameters in (6)' are E'C(g1+a1—a0)/0'), C(b1—b0)/ff}, and
{(c1—c)/U)]. It follows that of the parameters A,B,C,0 appearing in
the forecasting model (8), n/a, B, and C are always identified. 0'is
identified if either b1ba or c1 Ca.
Thecondition for identification of ifcanbe explained..If b1 =
andc1 =c0,the monetary returns to academic ability are identical in
the teaching and non—teaching occupations. Then the probability of
choosing teaching is invariant with respect to academic ability.In
this case, we cannot infer the impact of salary on occupation choice
from the empirical pattern of ability and occupation choice.20
B.Estimation of the Parameters
In principle, (5a)—(5b) and (6) can be estimated by the full
information maximum likelihood method. See Maddala(1983), P.283 f or
details. To obtain the maximum likelihood estimate, a more or less
standard iterative optimization algorithm was written. The routine uses
the outer product of the score function to generate a search direction.
It performs a linear search along this direction using an iterative
quadratic inter(extra)polation method.. The score function is calculated
by applying two—sided numerical derivatives to the log—likelihood
function.
Unfortunately, the estimation of switching regressions with endo—
genous selection is often more difficult in practice than in principle.
Applying the optimization program from a number of alternative starting
values, I have not been able to achieve convergent estimates. It turns
out that the likelihood is very flat in some regions of the parameter
space and has sharp ridges in others.. As a consequence, the algorithm
produces sequences of estimates that 'hang up' in the flat regions and
swing wildly across the parameter space in the regions with sharp
ridges.. Apparently, this kind of behavior is not atypical. Several
colleagues have reported that they have sometimes experienced similar
difficulties in the application of maximum likelihood to endogenous
switching models.
A simple alternative to maximum likelihood is the two—step approach
of Heckmari(1976). Also see Maddala(1983), P.223. The first step
ignores the presence of observations of reported earnings and stimaie'.
the identifiable parameters of equation (6), namely A/or, B/a, nd C/a,21
by maximum likelihood. We have already reported these estimates in
Table 3.
The second step estimates the identifiable parameters of equation
(5a) from the subsample of teachers by least squares regression of Y(l)
on an intercept, S,R, and an estimate of the Mills ratio'. The
identifiable parameters of C5b) are estimated in the same manner. As is
well known, the validity of the second step derives from the fact that
conditional on S,R, and on being selected into the sample, the expected
values of the disturbances (tl)+€(t1) and t(tO)+E(tO) are
(lOa) EES(1)+€(l) IS,R, '<A+B*S+C*R] =—X1*M(1)
(lOb) E(8(O)+E(O)IS,R, iI > A+B*S+C*R] =
HereX1=E(C(1)÷E(1))*11], A0=E(C&(O)+E(O)}*11] and MU) and M(O) are the
Mills ratios
(1 là) M( 1) =éE(A+B*S+C*R) /a]/f[(A-+B*S+C*R)Ia]
Uib) M(O) =4E(A+B*S+C*R) /a]/Cl—$E (A+B*S+C*R) 1a).
•is the standard normal density and $isthe standard normal
distribution function. To estimate M(l) and M(O), one uses the first
step results.
Note that the least squares estimates reported earlier in Table 5
differ from the second step estimates in that they omit the Mills ratio
variables. The Table 5 estimates are inconsistent for the parameters of22
(5a)—(5b) unless A1 =A0=0.Given that 1)E —(y+E(1)—E(0)],the A
coefficients are generally nonzero unless E(1) and E(0) are identically
zero. But this holds only if expected earnings in teaching and non—
teaching are determined solely by SAT score and high school class rank
Such a sharp restriction is implausible.
Execution of the second step of the two step method always yields a
numerical estimate. As with maximum likelihood, however, application
can be less gratifying than the theory suggests. In particular, the
fact that S and R are highly collinear with the Mills ratio variables
suggests that if the values of A are far from zero, large samples may be
required to obtain useable second step estimates.
In fact, the second step estimates obtained on our sex—disaggregated
samples were not very credible and had large reported standard errors.
Given this, it was natural to consider pooling the samples for males and
females in an attempt to obtain more precise estimates. Pooling seemed
justified because the slope coefficients of the occupation choice and
earnings functions reported in Tables 3 and 5 are very similar for males
and females. This suggests that we can safely constrain the slope
parameter-s of (5a)—(Sb) to be equal for males and females.
Estimates based on the pooled samples are given in Table 6. The
numbers listed in the 'Reported Standard Error columns do not correct
+ or heteroskedasticity nor for the fact that the Mills ratios have
themselves been estimated. Nevertheless, they should at least indicate
the orders of magnitude of the true standard errors.
The results in Table 6 are amazingly sensible, especially given the
estimation difficulties described above. Our primary interest is in• the
estimates of the returns to academic ability. First observe that the23
partial return to high school class rank is almost identically positive
in the teaching and non—teaching occupations, that is c1c0 > 0. This
accords well with our estimates of equation (6) ,reportedin Table 3.
There we found that all else equal, the frequency of choice of teaching
as an occupation does not vary with class rank, that is (c1—c&/O0.
Second, observe that Table 6 and Table 3 are in agreement in their
estimates of the returns to SAT score. In Table 3, we saw that all else
equal, the frequency of choice of teaching as an occupation falls as SAT
score rises, that is (b1—b0)/o < 0.In Table 6, we find that there is
no partial return to SAT score in teaching and a positive return in non—
teaching, that is 0b1 < b.
Recall that 0isidentified if either b1b0 or c1c0. Based on
the estimates in Tables 3 and 6, it seems well founded to conclude that
the former condition holds and the latter does not. A consistent
estimate for o can be formed by evaluating the identity
(12) Cr= (b1—b)/[(b1—b0i/G).
atthe estimates of b1 and bagiven in Table 6 and the estimate of
(baba)/ff given in Table3.Weobtain the estimates 0.004and0.127
from Table 6 and—0.0011 from Table .Therefore,our estimate for ifis
111.8.
Now let us consider some other aspects of Table 6. We find that in
teaching, males andfemaleshaveessentially the same interceptsin
their earningsfunctions.Innon—teaching, theintercept for females is
ninetydollars per week lower than for males. This corroborates the.
pattern of sex differentials observed in Table 4.24
The estimates of the Mills ratio coefficients satisfy 0 < —A1 < )o.
This pattern is easily explainable. Observe that
(13a) —As=EEC8(1)+E(1)}*(Y+€(1)-E(0)}]
(13b) Ac,=E(C8(0)+E(O))*CE(0)—E(1)—Y)].
and consider the case in which the random variables are mutually indep-
endent. Then (13a)—(13b) reduce to —A,, =VartECi)]> 0 and Ac, =
Var[E(0)]> 0. Moreover, we know from Table 4 that conditioning on
academic ability, the variance of reported earnings in non—teaching is
larger than in teaching. This suggests that Var(E(1)] < VarCECO)].
Thus, there is an inherent predisposition towards the pattern 0 < —A1 <
Xc,.Toalter this pattern, the random variables must be mutually
dependent in a sufficiently strong and perverse manner.
We earlier pointed out that if —A,, and Ac, are nonzero, the least
squares estimates of Table 5 are biased. We can with some confidence
predict the nature of the bias. Given that C c,,—c00, the Mills
ratios MCi) and MC0) defined in (lla)—(ilb) do not vary with the class
rank variable R. We shoud therefore expect only a small bias, if any,
in the estimates of c,, and cc, given in Tables 5. Given that B b,,—bc, <
0, MCi) is an increasing function of S and M(0) is a decreasing one.
Since —A,, and Ac, are positive, we should expect that the estimate of b,,
in Table S is biased upward and that of bc, is biased downward.
Comparison of Tables 5 and 6 supports all of these predictions. The
estimatedreturns toclass rank are in the neighborhood o-f0.35in both
tables.On the other hand, the estimated returns to SAT score differ25
substantially between the two tables. The estimates of b1 drop from
0.045 in Table 5 to 0.004 in Table 6. The estimates of b0 rise from
0..064 in Table 5 to 0.127 in Table 6.
5.THE IMPACT OF EARNINGS AND ABILITY STANDARDS ON THE TEACHING FORCE
In this Section, we apply the estimated model of occupation choice
and earnings to forecast the consequences of some plausible policy
proposals. Many parties have suggested that the size and quality of the
teaching force can be influenced by combining increases in teacher
salaries with the institution of minimum academic ability standards. We
shall evaluate policies that combine an across the board salary increase
of X dollars per week with a minimum SAT score M for certification as a
teacher. In practice, the SAT itself would probably not be used as
criterion for teacher certification. Our forecasts are of interest if a
certification test similar to the SAT is invoked.
Let D(S,M)=1 if S>M, D(S,M)=O otherwise. As earlier, let + be the
standard normal distribution function. Under (B) and (9), the
probability that a member of the NL572 cohort with SAT score S and class
rank R is eligible to teach and chooses teaching as his occupation is
(14) 'P(S,R,X,M) $[(A +B*S+C*R+X/0]*D(s,M).
To obtain an operational version of (14), we use the estimates
reported in Tables 3 and 6 and accept the evidence that C0.Let FF1
ifthe respondent is female and F=0 if male. Then26
(15) p(F,S,X,M) +(—O.304 +O.869*F—O.OO11*S+O.0089*X)*D(S,M)
predicts the probability that a working NLS72 college graduate with SAT
score S and sex F would have become a teacher under the policy
characterized by (X,M).
Given (15), we can easily predict the aggregate behavior of the NLS72




estimates the fraction of the cohort who would have become teachers
under policy (X,M). The average SAT score of those who would have
become teachers can be estimated by
1N
(17) ft(X,M) E 5* p(F,S,X,M)/q(X,M).
n1
To the extent that the cohort of working NLS72 college graduates are
representative of the population from which teachers are drawn,
computations of q'(X,M) and (X,M) provide forecasts ofthenationwide
effect of policies combining salary increases with academic ability
standards.
Table 7 reports forecasts for thirty values of the (X,M) pair. The
following major results emerge:
*Inthe absence of a minimum ability standard, increases in teacher
earnings yield substantial growth in the size of the teaching force.
This is seen by inspection of the top row of Table 7.Setting X =$2527
is predicted to raise the supply of teachers from 19 percent of the
cohort to 24 percent. Setting X =$100is predicted to raise the
supply of teachers to 44 percent of the cohort.
Recall from Table 4 that the mean reported earnings in 1979 of the
NLS72 teacher-s was about $225 per week. Allowing for the fact that
reported earnings may be somewhat lower than expected earnings, $25
is about a 10 percent increase in expected earnings and $100 is about
a 40 percent increase. This implies that the aggregate wage
elasticity of the supply of teachers ranges from about 2.4 for small
increases in salary to about 3.2 for large changes.
*Inthe absence of a minimum ability standard, increases in teacher
earnings yield only a minimal improvement in the average ability of
the teaching force. The top row of Table 7 predicts that as expected
earning5 is increased, the average SAT score of those who choose to
teach rises only very slightly, from 950 to 972. This is easily
explained. Increases in expected earnings do attract more high
ability students into teaching but they also attract more low ability
students. Overall, the relative growth in low and high ability
recruits turns out to be comparable to the initial composition of the
teaching force.
*Ifteacher salaries are not increased, institution of a minimum
ability standard improves the average ability of the teaching force
but reduces its size.. The first column of Table 7 predicts the
magnitude of these effects. In particular, requirement of a minimum
SAT score of 800 for teacher certification is predicted to raise the
aver-age SAT score of the teaching force from 950 to 1017 but to reduce
the supply of teachers from 19 percent to 15 percent of the NLS7228
cohort. The average SAT score of all college graduates is not far
from 1017. Thus, setting 800 as the minimum score for certification
succeeds in rai5ing average teacher ability to the national average,
at the cost of a 20 percent decline in the size of the teaching force.
*Theaverage ability of the teaching force can be improved and the size
of the teaching farce maintained if minimum ability standards are
combined with sufficient salary increases.. The entries in Tabe 7
reveal that if 800 is established as the minimum SAT score f or
certification,, salaries must be increased by $25 per week in order to
maintain the size of the teaching force at 19 percent of the NLS72
cohort. Then the average SAT score of the teaching farce is predicted
to be 1020.
If the minimum SAT score is set at 1000, prevention of a reduction
in the size of the teaching force is predicted to require a salary
increase of around $90 per week.In this case, the average SAT score
of the teaching force is predicted to be about 1130. Observe that
setting the minimum SAT score at 1000 leaves only 54 percent of the
NLS72 cohort eligible to be teachers. Thus, for 19 percent of the
cohort to become teachers, about 35 percent of all the eligible, high
ability college graduates must choose to enter teaching. It should
not be surprising that a substantial increase in salaries is needed to
induce such a large shift from present patterns of behavior.29
6. CONCLUSION
Evaluation of proposals to improve the quality of the teaching force
requires credible forecasts of the consequences of these proposals.
Credible forecasting requires an empirical understanding of the
determinants of occupation choices. In this paper, we have attempted to
provide the needed empirical analysis and have offered forecasts derived
from it.
Our interpretation of the NLS72 data rests on a number of maintained
assumptions. We have taken care to call attention to these assumptions.
We have also noted difficulties experienced in executing certain
approaches to parameter estimation. Clearly, our analysis should be
accepted with caution. At the same time, the analysis should prove
useful. In the past, discussion of policies intended to induce more
high ability students to enter teaching has been conducted in a vacuum.
Now, some quantitative forecasts have been laid on the table.30
Charles F. Manski
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801 —1000 1001 -1200 1201-1600
.16 .11 .06 .05
.22 .23 .36 .55
.62 .66 .58 .40
148 400 501 221
8. Females32
Table 2:Occupation as a Function of Sex and High School Class Rank
A.Males
Percentile Class Rank

















Respondents 242 388 305 249
B.Females
Teachers .35 .31 .24 .20
Professional .14 .23 .29 .39
Other .51 .46 .47 .41
Number of






















Table 3:Probit Model Of Teaching OccupatiQn As A








Table 4:Pay Per Week as a Function of Sex, SAT Score and Occupation
A. Males
SAT Score(Verbal +Math)
Occupation 400-800 801—1000 1001—1200 1201-1600 Total
Teacher Mean237* 222 236 237 230
Count 14 40 21 11 86
Std. Dev. 63 47 75 62 59
Professional320 328 328 365 337
26 78 155 89 348
91 89 99 85 94
Other 271 283 2GB 286 283
80 212 218 56 566
101 104 97 92 100
Total 278 286 301 327 297
120 330 394 156 1000
98 100 100 97 100
B. Females
Teacher Mean 199 223 227 216 219
Count 51 102 75 13 241
Std. Dev. 54 53 53 65 55
Professional272 272 271 309 279
24 90 127 56 297
153 70 69 84 83
Other 221 218 225 268 227
86 149 142 54 431
70 71 7i 90 76
Total 234 243 281 241
161 341 344 123 969
86 69 72 89 78
*dollars, reported in October, 197935
Table 5:Linear Model of Earnings as a Function of
Sex, Occupation, and Academic Ability*
A.Male Teachers B.Male Non—Teachers
Variable CoefficientStnd. Error CoefficientStnd. Error
SAT Score 0.0506 (0.0475) 0.0726 (0.0234)
200 -1600
Class Rank 0.285 (0.421) 0.350 (0.189)
1 —100
Intercept 158. (41.) 204.. (21..)
R squared .04 .03
Sample Size 64 748
C. Female Teachers D.Female Non—Teachers
SAT Score 0.0401 (0.0279) 0.01 (0.0219) 400 —1600
Class Rank 0.419 (0.239) 0.369 (0.229)
1—100
Intercept 147. (22.) 162. (20.)
R squared .06 .03
Sample Size 188 593
*Earnings is in dollars per ieek, in 1979.36
Table 6:Revised Linear Model ofEarningsas a Function of
Sex,Occupation, and Academic Ability*
All Teachers All Non—Teachers
Reported Reported
Variable CoefficientStnd. Error CoefficientStnd. Error
SAT Score 0.004 (0.060) 0.127 (0.031)
400 —1600
Class Rank 0.389 (0.207) 0.326 (0.145)
1—100
Intercept 118. (60.) 128. (39.)
Sex Dummy 12.8 (35.5) —92.3 (16.6)
1 for Females
Mills Ratio 42.2 (59.7) 140.0 (61.3)
0—*
R squared .07 .11
Sample Size 253 1344
*Earnings is in dollars per week, in 1979.37
Table 7:Forecast Supply and Ability of Teachers as a Function
of Earnings and Standards
Minimum SAT Score
and Fraction of Change in Earnings Per Week(1979 Dollars)
Cohort Above Minimum +0 +25 +50 +75 +100
400 1.00
Supply of Teachers*.19 0.24 0.30 0.37 0.44
Average SAT Score 950 956 961 966 972
600 0.98
0.18 0.23 0.29 0.36 0.43
965 970 974 979 984
700 0.94
0.17 0.22 0.27 0.34 0.41
989 992 996 1000 1004
800 0.88
0.15 0.19 0.25 0.31 0.37
1017 1020 1023 1026 1029
900 0.73
0.12 0.15 0.19 0.24 0.30
1064 1067 1069 1072 1074
1000 0.54
0.08 0.10 0.13 0.17 0.20
1126 1127 1129 1130 1132
*fraction of the cohort of working NLS72 college graduates who have
SAT score above the minimum and are forecast to choose teaching